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After the Paris Agreement 
New Challenges for the EU’s Leadership in Climate Policy 
Susanne Dröge and Oliver Geden 
In December 2015, 195 countries adopted a new global climate agreement in Paris. It 
provides an expanded regulatory framework and specifies the goals of the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). A significant number of states includ-
ing the U.S. are expected to ratify the Paris Agreement (PA) within the year. Industrial-
ized nations have a strong obligation to keep up the momentum that was generated in 
Paris. If the European Union (EU) wants to maintain its leadership role, it should focus on 
two key tasks in 2016. First, it should speed up legislation to implement the climate and 
energy targets for 2030 adopted by the European Council, a political prerequisite for 
Member States’ ratification of the PA. Second, it should expand and strengthen coopera-
tion with the developing countries. For the immediate future, an increase in EU climate 
ambitions for 2030 or 2050 is not likely to become part of the political agenda. 
 
The Paris Agreement differs fundamentally 
from the Kyoto Protocol, which still regu-
lates global climate protection under inter-
national law up to 2020. Instead of relying 
on multilaterally negotiated provisions 
for emissions reductions, countries have 
now decided to develop their own national 
agendas. By establishing transparent rules 
and unified standards and ensuring a 
mutual exchange of information, they 
intend to lay the foundation for stronger 
climate policy cooperation. 
National intentions rather than 
global requirements 
At the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) 
in Paris, it was decided that future global 
climate policy will be based on “nationally 
determined contributions” (NDCs; prior to 
the Paris Agreement preceded by “intended” 
and referred to as INDCs). NDCs may include 
not only mitigation targets but also infor-
mation about adaptation needs. They can 
also specify political instruments or condi-
tionality, based, for instance, on the pro-
vision of financial support. For the first time 
in UNFCCC history, this places all signato-
ries in a position to participate in global 
climate policy based on their own national 
interests (see SWP Research Paper 4/2016). 
Even before the start of the COP21 in 
Paris, 188 states had already submitted 
initial INDCs to the UNFCCC. Article 3 PA 
stipulates that the contracting parties will 
be under obligation to determine their 
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NDCs, to submit them on a regular basis, 
and not to fall below the level of their pre-
vious commitments (“progression”). The re-
duction targets contained in the NDCs are 
not part of the agreement and are thus not 
binding under international law. According 
to Article 4, states are expected to under-
take national measures to implement the 
submitted NDCs. Rules for streamlining, for 
unifying processes and standards, and for 
promoting synchronization of timelines 
remain to be negotiated in detail. 
Clear focus on protecting the climate 
According to the Paris Agreement, emis-
sions reduction efforts should focus on the 
goal of keeping global warming “well below” 
2 degrees Celsius. The PA also mentions the 
1.5 degree target that many island states 
had been pushing for but asks countries 
merely “to pursue efforts.” Furthermore, in 
the second half of the 21st century, remain-
ing emissions should be balanced to achieve 
greenhouse gas neutrality. Since emissions 
from agriculture, land use, and some indus-
trial processes cannot be avoided entirely, 
these will have to be compensated by using 
technologies that are able to remove CO2, 
such as massive reforestation or the com-
bination of bioenergy production with car-
bon capture and storage (BECCS). 
The Paris Agreement requires that indus-
trialized countries specify absolute emis-
sions reduction targets in their future NDCs. 
Developing countries are to increase miti-
gation efforts, which can be set as relative 
targets or as pathways over time. They will 
receive financial, technical, and practical 
support. The PA contains no explicit pro-
visions for emerging economies. What it 
requires of all countries is that net emis-
sions be reduced to zero by 2100. 
Adaptation to climate change 
The Paris Agreement is the first major treaty 
under the UNFCCC to explicitly regulate 
how the consequences of climate change 
are to be dealt with. It formulates the global 
adaptation targets in less concrete terms 
than the mitigation goals, however. Article 
7 of the Paris Agreement contains a quali-
tative target: Overall capacities for adapta-
tion to climate change should be increased 
so that vulnerability is reduced and resili-
ence to climate change is strengthened. It 
also notes regional differences in the con-
sequences of climate change and the diver-
sity of actors involved as well as the need 
for financial aid and closer cooperation. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Paris 
Agreement attributes the same importance 
to adaptation as it does to mitigation. This 
is the result of longstanding demands raised 
by the developing countries. The Cancun 
Adaptation Framework (CAF) created within 
the UNFCCC context in 2010 will be respon-
sible for ensuring the flow of information 
and the implementation and communica-
tion of the adaptation agenda. The agree-
ment also provides an explicit guarantee 
that the developing countries will receive 
support for their efforts. 
Climate finance 
The catalyst for increased participation in 
mitigation efforts and the achievement of 
adaptation targets is set out in Article 9, 
which deals with climate financing. This 
area, too, will be subject to a regular evalua-
tion known as a “global stocktake”. The 
OECD countries are obligated to provide 
funding, while the developing countries 
can do so on a voluntary basis. Funds will 
only be disbursed, however, when the re-
cipient countries can demonstrate that they 
are implementing their NDCs. So far, cli-
mate financing has not been provided in a 
reliable manner. The Green Climate Fund 
(GCF) has been created as the central UN 
institution for climate finance, but the in-
flow of funds from industrialized countries 
in the amount of 100 billion US dollars per 
year by 2020 is not yet fully guaranteed. 
Also, the first GCF projects have only recently 
been approved. Further talks will take place 
under the PA up to 2025 about increasing 
financial support from the industrialized 
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countries, and exceeding the currently 
pledged 100 billion US dollars. 
The new climate regime thus demands 
leadership by the industrialized countries 
here as well: They are called upon to push 
global climate policy forward by providing 
support to developing countries in all areas. 
Donor countries, on the other hand, will be 
allowed to provide this support conditional 
on the transparency and measurability of 
the developing countries’ activities. 
Entry into force and 
further development 
The implementation of the Paris Agreement 
will be accompanied by the annual Confer-
ence of the Parties serving as the Meeting 
of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA), 
which will be held together with the regu-
lar COPs of the UNFCCC. The CMA will 
be able to commence work as soon as the 
agreement has entered into force. For this 
to happen, it will have to be ratified by at 
least 55 states that are responsible for a 
total percentage of at least 55 percent of 
global emissions. The first overall examina-
tion of mitigation efforts under the Paris 
Agreement (“facilitative dialogue”) is 
planned for 2018. This process is intended 
to invigorate the next round of NDCs that 
must be submitted under the provisions of 
the agreement on a regular basis. Countries 
are under no obligation, however, to in-
crease their existing INDCs following the 
facilitative dialogue. After the agreement 
enters into force, global stocktakes are 
scheduled to take place on a five-year cycle. 
The first comprehensive evaluation of miti-
gation and climate finance will take place 
in 2023 (Global Stocktake, Article 14 PA). 
Legislative procedures in the EU 
For the EU, the climate negotiations in 
Paris were a diplomatic success. Although 
the EU can still be considered a global 
leader in climate policy, the Paris Agree-
ment is also creating pressure for European 
leaders to take more decisive action. 
Up to now, the EU climate target of 
reducing emissions by at least 40 percent 
by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels) adopted 
by the 28 heads of state and government 
in October 2014 has only been a statement 
of intention. In order to prevent the sub-
stantial differences between EU Member 
States from becoming an explosive issue in 
the run-up to COP21, the EU Commission 
came to an agreement with Member States 
to deliberately refrain from early introduc-
tion of particularly controversial legislative 
procedures (see SWP Comments 55/2014). The 
amendment of the emissions trading direc-
tive that will regulate the power sector and 
energy-intensive industry had already been 
largely pre-structured by the European 
Council and is currently under discussion 
in the committees of the European Parlia-
ment. The creation of new national emis-
sions reduction targets for those sectors that 
are not covered by the emissions trading 
system (transport, heating, services) has 
been postponed. As soon as the Commission 
publishes its proposal on this issue (Effort 
Sharing Decision, expected before the sum-
mer break in 2016), deep-seated and in part 
also ideologically driven conflicts between 
Member States are highly likely. Poland’s 
new government will almost certainly stand 
at the center of these disputes. 
To fulfill its international obligations, 
the EU will for the first time have to define 
a legal instrument to calculate land use, 
land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) as 
part of the EU’s overall emissions reduction 
target. This could facilitate negotiations 
within Europe, but it also entails the risk of 
diluting the EU climate target. In addition, 
further potentially conflictual legislative 
procedures are likely to be opened in 2016. 
These include the amendment of the renew-
able energy directive as well as a mecha-
nism designed to provide “European Energy 
Governance.” Also expected in the coming 
year is an equally controversially proposal 
for a guideline to tighten the CO2 emissions 
limit for passenger cars from 2021 on. 
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The challenge of maintaining 
EU leadership 
After the euphoria of the Paris climate 
summit, the EU is now confronted with 
the realities of a long uphill battle to main-
tain its climate policy leadership. Its initial 
focus will be on the task of translating the 
previously agreed energy and climate head-
line targets into binding legislation. On 
the international level, this process will 
be followed very closely to see whether the 
EU is capable of working out climate policy 
compromises internally, all the more since 
this is seen as a prerequisite for the EU’s 
ratification of the Paris Agreement. 
The question of whether the EU will 
intensify mitigation efforts in light of 
the PA will be of little importance to the 
Juncker Commission, which remains in 
office through 2019. Much more prominent 
issues will include differences within the 
EU over refugee policy, a possible Brexit, 
and the still-smoldering Eurozone crisis. 
At present, the Commission is attempting 
to keep debate from even starting over 
strengthening the 40 percent target for 
2030. It came as some surprise that the 
Commission’s first position paper advocated 
only a modified climate roadmap for 2050 
and suggested adopting new EU climate 
targets solely for the post-2030 period. Since 
the issue of a new 2030 emissions reduction 
target would cause the profound differ-
ences between the Member States to flare 
up again, it is unlikely that the European 
Council, which is responsible for setting EU 
climate objectives, will treat this question 
as a priority in the near future – especially 
since its decisions are by consensus. 
While leaving the EU climate target for 
2030 unchanged would not be in conflict 
with the text of the Paris Agreement, this 
would certainly contradict its spirit. Inter-
national observers would see this as an 
indication that the EU is abdicating its 
leadership role. Moreover, it would be 
incompatible with the particular respon-
sibility that industrialized countries 
took upon themselves in Paris for climate 
protection. 
Because of its internal division, the EU 
and its 28 Member States are not likely to 
ratify the Paris Agreement soon. Since the 
requirements for its entry into force are not 
particularly high, they can be met without 
the EU. Yet this would be detrimental to the 
EU’s credibility on climate policy – especially 
from the standpoint of countries that are 
partners to the “high ambition coalition” 
that helped make COP21 a success, and 
those that are most severely affected by cli-
mate change. In the likely case that the PA 
enters into force prior to EU ratification, 
the EU will not be allowed to participate in 
initial decision-making over the many rules 
and procedures needed for the implemen-
tation of the Paris Agreement. This will add 
to the overall challenge that faces the EU 
as it attempts to maintain its position as a 
leader in global climate policy. Although 
the UNFCCC secretariat is already consider-
ing the option of suspending the first for-
mal CMA session if it would otherwise have 
to be convened with a minimal number of 
Parties, this would nevertheless highlight 
the EU’s growing difficulties in reaching 
internal consensus. This not only affects the 
PA and the EU’s legislation on implement-
ing its 2030 headline targets but also plays 
a role in the still pending EU ratification of 
the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Proto-
col, which is intended to establish Kyoto’s 
second commitment period (2013–2020). 
Currently, Europeans can only meet the 
expectations resulting from the Paris Agree-
ment in two key ways: by increasing financ-
ing commitments and by working to create 
and expand cooperation projects with 
developing countries. In the context of the 
current refugee crisis, it will be easier to 
mobilize support to countries where cli-
mate change impacts could exacerbate sup-
ply risks and threaten to increase instabil-
ity. For EU climate diplomacy, the challenge 
will be to convince important partner coun-
tries during ongoing UNFCCC negotiations 
that EU climate policy remains a reliable 
model for others – despite the differences 
that exist within the Union. 
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